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Chapter 9
Psychiatry, objectivity,  
and realism about value
Michael loughlin and Andrew Miles
9.1 Introductory Remarks
When the editors of this volume asked us to supply a chapter outlining a “per-
spective” on psychiatric validation, they invited us to consider two questions:
1. How does your perspective compare and contrast with the other existing 
views/models of validation?
2. What are the prospects that your model can contribute to a single model of 
validation adopted by the whole field?
While the argument we go on to develop provides an answer, of sorts, to these 
questions, it is probably not the answer the editors were wanting or expecting. 
Indeed, it is an answer that might initially strike readers as bizarre, as it chal-
lenges certain pervasive background assumptions that, we argue, need to be 
revised before we can begin to make progress in this area. It is, if you like, the 
“groundwork” that needs to be done before we can attempt to give a sensible 
answer to the question of what is the right “model” of psychiatric validation.
We sketch the outline of an approach to validation, but it is one that con-
verts questions about psychiatric validation into questions of a primarily moral 
nature, and our concluding comments make reference to the sort of epistemic 
and ethical virtues we need to develop via the education of practitioners, rather 
than suggestions for the development of formal guidelines, criteria, and uni-
fied processes. This is because we think that, before psychiatry can progress, 
we need to understand fully the underlying conceptual problems that led to 
what is sometimes termed the “crisis” in psychiatry (Loughlin et al. 2013b). 
Underlying assumptions, by no means exclusive to psychiatry, about the rela-
tionship between science and value generated quite specific problems for this 
area of practice. For psychiatry to defend and develop its intellectual framework 
we need to bring these assumptions out in the open, subject them to critical 
scrutiny, and, we argue, reject them.
So, in answer to question 2, we are precisely as far away from having a “single 
model” as we are from having a broad consensus on the nature of the human 
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good. But we can begin to defend different conceptions of the human good 
and use them as the basis for diagnosis—a diagnosis will be valid contingent 
upon the assumption of a normative framework, which will require defense in 
terms of moral arguments. In reply to question 1, what we offer here is more of 
a meta-perspective, a view on what is necessary for any model if it is to have a 
hope of being valid. We are not in a position to deliver the final word on any 
of the important practical issues other contributors to this volume discuss, but 
hope more modestly to “contribute” to the debate by providing a method for 
examining assumptions, reframing problems where necessary in an area that is 
going to remain extremely controversial for the foreseeable future.
9.2 Don’t Start Here
There is a joke English tourists sometimes tell about asking directions in certain 
parts of Ireland. Supposedly, when you ask how to get from some remote place 
to a local landmark or vantage point, people will tell you, “Well, you don’t start 
from here.” Now, if that really is all the locals are prepared to say, then it is, argu-
ably, a little unhelpful, but if followed by instructions on how to retrace one’s 
steps, to get back to a place where it will be easier to get clear directions, then it 
may be the best, most practical advice it is reasonable to expect in the context.
Certainly, when it comes to matters more complex than the quest to find and 
photograph the Holy Stone of Clonrichert, there are questions to which the 
warning not to start from here is the best response that one can give (Loughlin 
2007). In this chapter, we will argue that a cluster of questions surrounding 
the issue of psychiatric validation fall into this category, including how to clas-
sify mental disorders, and how to explain the relationship between mental and 
physical health and illness so as to be able to diagnose and care for the mental 
health needs of one’s fellow human beings. Before we can give a full, satisfying, 
and truthful answer to these questions, we need to retrace the intellectual steps 
that led some astute contemporary thinkers to regard the very idea of “mental 
illness” with suspicion.
Questions about the scientific validity of psychiatric diagnosis derive their 
meaning and impetus from specific conceptions of science, value, and reality. It 
is possible to identify these conceptions and their origins in our intellectual his-
tory, and to examine the intellectual framework of which they form component 
parts. We propose that, instead of working within that framework, in this case 
what is needed is a revision of the framework itself—a redrawing of the concep-
tual map to describe different relationships between value, reality, and science. 
Sometimes, to solve particular problems, or even (more modestly) to discover 
a perspective upon the problems which enables us to view their solution as 
attainable, we need to accept that some fundamental feature of the way we see 
the world is wrong. In such cases, we do not need to gather further empirical 
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evidence, nor do we need a more astute analysis of that evidence, but rather we 
need a philosophical shift: a revision in the way the evidence is conceptualized 
or “framed” (Loughlin et al. 2010). Such a shift can change our views regarding 
what counts as evidence in the first place, and what methods of analyzing that 
evidence are appropriate. It will require us to step back from the current debate, 
to remind ourselves how we got to where we are now, and how certain dichoto-
mies became part of our standard academic lexicon.
The feature of our contemporary world-view that stands in the way of pro-
gress, in the discussion of health care generally but most significantly in the 
discussion of mental health and illness, is a presupposition we will express as 
subjectivism with respect to value, or simply value-subjectivism. This presup-
position is implicit in popular accounts of the key features distinguishing sci-
entific analysis on the one hand, from moral judgment on the other (Loughlin 
2013a), and it gives rise to what some authors characterize as “the myth of moral 
neutrality” in psychiatric diagnosis (Hamilton 2013) and in science in general 
(Loughlin 1998). Though it by no means originates in the modern era, today’s 
pervasive subjectivism about value owes a good deal of its intuitive plausibil-
ity to the currently dominant and (in a sense we’ll explain) characteristically 
“modern” view of the world and our place within it. Before we can arrive at a 
proper methodology in psychiatry, we must jettison those features of our con-
ceptual framework that require authors either to deny the irreducibly moral 
nature of psychiatric diagnosis or to reject psychiatry as scientifically unsound.
Thus, we submit this chapter as a contribution to the philosophy of psychia-
try, in that it does not represent a proof that subjectivism with respect to value 
is false (although, for independent reasons we think it is false), but it does tell 
us that we must believe this philosophical position to be false if we believe that 
psychiatric diagnosis can, in principle, be valid.
9.3 How We Got Here
Powerful criticisms articulated by exponents of the anti-psychiatry movement 
in the latter half of the twentieth century (Szasz 1960; Cooper 1967; Foucault 
1987) led to what some authors have described as a “crisis” in psychiatry, one 
“sufficiently serious to jeopardize the constitution of psychiatry as a medical 
discipline” (Loughlin et al. 2013b: 418). While these arguments are well known, 
it is worth reminding ourselves that the key problem for characterizing psychi-
atric diagnosis as a valid branch of medicine was, for Szasz, the specific relation-
ship between “the context of value” and the diagnosis of “mental illness”:
The concept of illness, whether bodily or mental, implies deviation from some clearly 
defined norm. In the case of physical illness, the norm is the structural and functional 
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integrity of the human body . . . The norm from which deviation is measured when-
ever one speaks of a mental illness is a psycho-social and ethical one.” (Szasz 1960: 114, 
emphasis in original)
While Szasz clearly recognizes that “the practice of medicine is intimately tied 
to ethics” (1960: 115), he maintains that psychiatry is “very much more inti-
mately tied to problems of ethics than is medicine” (1960: 116) and attempts 
to capture the essential difference between each discipline’s relationship with 
value by noting that, “although the desirability of physical health, as such, is 
an ethical value, what health is can be stated in anatomical and physiological 
terms” (1960: 114).
The point seems to be that while we cannot practice medicine in a way that is 
“free of ethical value” (and interestingly, we cannot do medical research without 
similarly becoming embroiled in “many ethical considerations and judgments” 
(Szasz 1960: 115)), we can at least explain the ontology of physical health in 
value-neutral terms, because “what health is” can be stated in terms of the lan-
guage of anatomy and physiology. So, Szasz says:
The notion of mental symptom is therefore inextricably tied to the social (including 
ethical) context in which it is made in much the same way as the notion of bodily symp-
tom is tied to an anatomical and genetic context (1960: 114), [and] whereas bodily dis-
ease refers to public, physicochemical occurrences, the notion of mental illness is used 
to codify relatively more private, sociopsychological happenings of which the observer 
(diagnostician) forms a part. (1960: 116)
How is it that the observer “forms a part” when mental illness is being diag-
nosed, but not so when the illness being diagnosed is physical? There is an 
implied ontological distinction here: “bodily disease” is a “public” entity. The 
language of “public occurrences” suggests things that can be observed from 
any perspective, whatever the observer’s private beliefs and values. In contrast, 
the identification of a mental illness requires engaging with norms of an “ethi-
cal” nature, which are, by implication, subject-dependent, being social con-
structs or subjective reactions to the reality observed. Having characterized 
the relevant norms as “ethical,” Szasz feels this leads directly to the question 
(1960: 115): “Who defines the norms . . .?” swiftly giving rise to the follow-up 
question: “Whose agent is the psychiatrist?” Questions of agency and subjectiv-
ity are raised by the presence of ethical norms in a way that they are not imme-
diately raised by diagnosis in (genuine) medical science, where what the thing 
observed “is” can be classified as a “bodily disease”.
According to Szasz, the realization that the psychiatrist “does not stand apart 
from what he observes” but is already committed to a picture of the world that 
includes ethical norms “stands in opposition to a currently prevalent claim, 
according to which mental illness is just as ‘real’ and ‘objective’ as bodily illness” 
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(1960: 116). Szasz instantly qualifies this point by admitting some confusion as 
to exactly what is meant by such words as “real” and “objective,” but he says he 
suspects “that what is intended by the proponents of this view is to create the 
idea in the popular mind that mental illness is some sort of disease entity, like 
an infection or a malignancy” (1960: 116).
We have quoted Szasz at some length here because it is important to establish 
that, for this leading figure in the anti-psychiatry movement, problems for the 
“objectivity” and “reality” of mental illness are closely related to the require-
ment for value-judgments (where the values in question are moral, or as Szasz 
prefers, “ethical”1) in the process of their diagnosis. While it is assumed that 
the “desirability” of physical health is an ethical matter, the ontology of disease 
is not: diseases are real “entities,” and this means they can be identified with-
out recourse to value-judgment. It would seem, then, that only that which is 
“objective” in this sense can be “real,” though because Szasz expresses himself 
via speculation on what those he is criticizing might mean, we must be cautious 
about ascribing a clear thesis to him on this point. However, the idea that there 
is a close conceptual connection between objectivity and reality, and that both 
of them lie on the other side of a conceptual divide from “ethical value,” does at 
least seem to be in influence.
So the extensive disputes in the contemporary philosophy of mind, about 
the relationship between specific mental states and brain states, while of great 
importance in their own right, do not in any immediate or obvious way impact 
on this particular problem. Even if we accept a strict identity theory, reducing 
any given mental state to some particular brain state, it will not follow that men-
tal disorders are reducible to brain disorders, as what is at issue is the type of 
“norm” relevant to the diagnosis of the disorder—and as Szasz noted, that norm 
remains a moral one (Banner 2013).
The area in which to seek a solution, then, would appear to be ethics, or 
what is sometimes categorized as “meta-ethics,” as it concerns the status of 
moral thinking and its relationship with other species of human thought. 
Human beings make value-judgments all the time, but is the making of a 
value-judgment a rational activity or some sort of alternative to rational think-
ing? Are “values” subjective reactions to the world, or is the making of certain 
value-commitments (or “evaluative perception”) a prerequisite for understand-
ing aspects of the world we encounter as they really are? (McDowell 1998; 
Dancy 2004).
In the decades following the publication of Szasz’s arguments, authors such 
as Fulford (1989) convincingly argued that, even if we accept that psychiatric 
diagnosis is value-laden, this does not imply that the process is invalid, because 
there are reasons to believe that all medical diagnosis is value-laden. Fulford 
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(amongst many others) has been accused of employing something called “the 
likeness argument” (Pickering 2003, 2006) in inferring that because mental ill-
ness is relevantly similar to physical illness, and because we cannot plausibly 
give up on the concept of physical illness, we must conclude that mental illness 
is at least as “real” as physical illness. While the “likeness argument” is not, in 
our view, a fallacy (Loughlin 2003), we maintain that we need to go further than 
Fulford seems prepared to go. Giving a full defense of the intellectual legitimacy 
of diagnosis in both medicine and psychiatry entails adopting a view we will 
express as realism with respect to value.
This should not, we must note, be read as implying that by adopting this 
view we somehow render disputes about value less controversial, but sim-
ply that where there are controversies they are bona fide controversies, not 
expressions of “subjective opinion” disguised as substantive claims. Claims 
about value are contentious but truth-apt: the aim of such debates is to dis-
cover the truth. Value-judgments, we contend, can be genuinely true, or 
genuinely false. When a practitioner is making up her mind about whether 
a person has, or does not have, condition X, she is making a judgment that 
is value-laden. But she is also making up her mind about a real question, 
not simply bringing to bear her own “subjective feelings” on the matter. The 
ability of diagnosis in medicine and psychiatry to be genuinely correct or 
incorrect is conceptually tied to the status of the value-judgments underly-
ing diagnosis: only if those judgments are truth-apt can it even be possible, in 
principle, for a diagnosis to be correct (or indeed, incorrect). Value-realism 
is a necessary presupposition of valid medical and psychiatric practice.
9.4 Science, Value, and Scientism
It follows that, to vindicate the necessary presuppositions of psychiatric diagno-
sis, we must believe two claims which, to many modern readers, may appear in 
tension if not outright contradiction. The first claim is that psychiatric diagno-
sis is inherently value-laden. The attempt to categorize a person’s mental state as 
more or less healthy, or to consider a person as suffering from a mental illness 
or indeed as mentally healthy, logically presupposes taking up an evaluative 
stance, asserting certain normative statements to be the case, and this presup-
poses some normative framework. That is to say, when we describe someone as 
in good or poor mental health, or as suffering from a mental illness, we commit 
ourselves logically to a value-laden position, to the view that there are ways that 
people should be and ways that they should not be. Any attempt to reduce or 
eliminate the evaluative aspect of diagnosis must, therefore, fail. Diagnosis of 
mental health, and indeed diagnosis of health in general, is not a value-neutral 
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project. The normative judgments or claims involved are not reducible to statis-
tical or other empirical claims.2
The second claim is that psychiatric diagnosis is an objective process in the 
specific sense that a diagnosis can be correct or incorrect. Claims about the 
mental health of persons are truth-apt: they can be true or false in the same way 
the claims about a person’s weight can be true or false. Those who claim that 
because psychiatric diagnosis is a value-laden process it is therefore “subjective” 
or “relative” (such as those critics of psychiatry who claim that it is the unscien-
tific imposition of arbitrary value-judgments upon human behavior) are mis-
taken. Psychiatric diagnosis can indeed be wrong, but this is because it can also 
be right. Wrong diagnoses can be extremely harmful, but even this judgment 
presupposes that claims about what is good or bad for persons are objective, in 
the sense that they are truth-apt.
Each of these claims might strike many readers as plausible in its own right. 
As Thornton (2011: 989) notes, “[t] o an unprejudiced eye, both the general con-
cept of illness and specific instances of illnesses simply look to be evaluative,” and 
claims that the “norms” in health are merely empirical and statistical just seem 
wrong because
there is more to pathology in general than what is unusual . . . . Illness is bad for us. So 
unless there is a way to explain away that apparently evaluative or normative aspect of 
illness, there is good reason to believe appearances . . . . Merely statistical analyses of 
what is usual and unusual do not seem to capture the fact that high intelligence is in 
itself a good thing and low intelligence is a bad thing.
Trying to make something like the badness of borderline intellectual func-
tioning objective by hand-waving in the direction of “value-free” evolution-
ary advantage doesn’t help here. For instance, the relationship between having 
above average intelligence (by definition deviating from the statistical norm) 
and having more descendants than those with merely average intelligence, or 
indeed the just plain stupid, is by no means factually established.3 However, cit-
ing Wakefield (1999), Thornton concedes that “[m] ore sophisticated attempts 
to use the notion of biological function have had the more modest aim of 
explaining away evaluative notions from the concept of disorder, rather than ill-
ness or disease, conceding that the latter notions also contain the ineliminable 
notion of harm”; but he notes that even with regard to that modest aim, “it is 
far from clear that the notion of failure of function presupposed explains away, 
rather than smuggling in, normative notions.”
Although the attempt to make the badness of maladaptive behaviors 
value-free fails, such badness is not therefore merely a matter of opinion, if 
that means we cannot be right or wrong about what is bad or harmful to us. 
We aim to bring up our children to make sound judgments about what is and is 
not harmful, and to avoid harm because we want them to live well. Outside the 
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context of academic debate no serious person disputes the claim that it is pos-
sible to make correct and incorrect judgments about what is harmful to oneself 
(Loughlin 2002: 226–8).
Why, then, do we claim that many modern readers might find a tension or 
even contradiction between these two, independently plausible claims regarding 
the value-laden nature of diagnosis and its objectivity? Both the first and second 
claims can be true if, and only if, a specific philosophical view about the nature 
of value is correct. This is the view that normative claims, about what should 
be the case, can be true or false, just as empirical claims, about what is or is not 
the case, can be true or false. The process of diagnosis, to be possible and valid, 
presupposes a specific position in philosophical ethics, which we characterize as 
realism with respect to value.
The problem is that our uses of language, including the terms “objectivity,” 
“subjectivity,” “rationality,” “science,” and “value,” are heavily influenced by a 
specific picture of the world and our place within it, which we have elsewhere 
characterized as “scientism” (Miles 2009; Miles and Loughlin 2011; Loughlin 
et al. 2013a). Scientism is sometimes equated with science, but this is a mis-
take. Scientism is not a scientific thesis but a philosophical thesis about the 
nature of science and “the relationship between science and either the truth, 
knowledge or reality” (Loughlin et al. 2013a: 131). So scientism can be under-
stood as the view that science, and only science, “reveals the truth, such that all 
true claims are part of a true scientific theory, or are reducible to claims of this 
sort” (Loughlin et al. 2013a: 132). Scientism is distinguished from an alterna-
tive philosophical position called “scientific realism,” which is the more mod-
est view that the posits of true scientific theories are real. While the scientific 
realist believes that science reveals genuine aspects of reality, the believer in 
scientism goes further, asserting that science reveals the essence of reality, 
such that only the posits of true scientific theories are real, and all else must 
either be reducible to the posits of true scientific theories or consigned to the 
realm of fiction (Loughlin et al. 2013a: 135).
The influence of scientism explains why the quest to distinguish science from 
non-science became a major preoccupation of twentieth-century philosophy 
(Loughlin et al. 2013a: 132). If science, and only science, can reveal the nature of 
reality, then it becomes imperative to discover criteria distinguishing genuine 
science from non-science. According to the assumptions of scientism, disci-
plines that wish to be taken seriously as vehicles for the discovery of truth about 
the world are required to establish their scientific credentials or to be dismissed.
We have given numerous examples elsewhere of the pervasive influence of 
this particular world-view on popular debate and practice within a range of aca-
demic and professional areas (Miles 2009; Loughlin et al. 2013a). For our present 
purposes, the most significant implication concerns the relationship between 
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“objectivity” and “value.” Scientism espouses what Nagel (1986:  91)  called 
“an epistemological criterion of reality,” defining what is real as that which is 
discoverable by science. The combination of this philosophical view with its 
account of the nature of science renders the idea of “objective value” a contra-
diction in terms:
Descartes is often credited as one of the finest exponents of the “modern” world view. 
Writing at the dawn of the scientific age, he famously divided reality into two realms, 
the “inner” or “subjective” and the “outer” or “objective” realms. The external world was 
characterised in terms of the language of the emerging, physical sciences. The impor-
tance of quantification to the emerging sciences is fundamental to understanding 
Descartes’ conception of the “external world”. External reality is, by definition, some-
thing we can measure. In contrast, “phenomena” are internal, subjective properties 
dependent for existence on a perceiving subject. (Loughlin et al. 2013a: 137)
Thus modern thinkers see an absolute dichotomy between the subjective and 
the objective, with all properties assigned to one side of this divide or the other. 
Later versions of scientism turned on the “subjective” side, insisting on its denial 
or reduction to the objective side—hence the increasing tendency to equate the 
“objective” with (a) the properties of the “external world” (taken to be, exclu-
sively, the measurable entities or properties posited by mechanistic science) and 
(b) claims that can be true or false (truth-apt).
By repeated association under the same term, based on the assumption that 
they are co-extensive, these two (logically distinct) senses of “objective” (publi-
cally observable and truth-apt) are effectively treated as equivalent. Eventually, 
the idea that all value-judgments are “subjective” acquires an almost self-evident 
status, as though it “just follows” from the meanings of “ordinary language” 
terms like “objective” and “true” (Loughlin et al. 2013a: 140). While the claim 
that Harry is 6ft tall refers to properties we can measure, the claim that Harry is 
a good person does not, so only the former claim is treated as truth-apt. If my 
criteria for calling someone a good person differ radically from yours, all that 
can be said is that we use the term in different ways, and there is no question 
that either usage (or associated criteria) can really be right or wrong: hence the 
modern dogma that all value-judgments are “mere expressions of opinion or 
preference.”
Once this particular division between the subjective and the objective has 
been posited, a number of philosophical problems come into being. “Human 
beings are rendered inherently problematic entities as they seem to straddle 
both realms and have properties (such as cognition and choice) that are not 
easily assigned to either one realm or the other” (Loughlin et al. 2013a: 137).
Medicine is thereby rendered problematic, psychiatry even more so. Both 
concern the human good, so are deemed subjective. A natural inclination is to 
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rescue these disciplines by showing that the value-judgments they embody can 
be reduced to properly “scientific”—meaning value-neutral—properties and 
concepts. But this is a mistake. Scientism allowed human beings to focus on 
the measurable aspects of the world and this focus undoubtedly gave rise to 
massive intellectual and social progress as a direct consequence. But it would be 
hasty to conclude that, because a particular way of viewing the world gave rise 
to intellectual progress, it is therefore the conclusion of the intellectual evolu-
tion of the species: “We should be sceptical of the idea that intellectual history 
came to an end, that the definitive and final world view was discovered at just 
about the point that we arrived on the scene” (Loughlin et al. 2013a: 136).
The time to revise an underlying philosophy or conceptual framework is, pre-
cisely, when it ceases to facilitate progress and seems instead to be standing in 
its way.4 Scientism’s failure to accommodate the value-laden and “humanistic” 
aspects of clinical practice (Miles 2009)  is a reason to revise this conceptual 
framework.
As we noted earlier, the employment by Fulford and others of what Pickering 
(2003) termed “the likeness argument” in support of the reality of mental ill-
ness need not be viewed as a fallacy, even though we concede that it does not, 
in itself, logically establish the conclusion that mental illnesses are real. The 
analogy with medicine serves to illustrate an important point. We would indeed 
have to give up far too much to maintain the absolute dichotomy between sci-
ence and value presupposed by the framework of scientism. To maintain an 
absolute divide between our evaluative and “human” capacities on the one 
hand, and “objectivity” on the other, would make practice not only in psychia-
try but in general medicine impossible. However extensive its empirical knowl-
edge base, a robot could not be a good medical practitioner, unless we found a 
way to program it in addition with a sound normative framework, giving it the 
ability to make human value judgments (Gelhaus 2011).
It follows that, if “objectivity” means “value-neutrality,” then it is a capacity 
of no use to, and in fact destructive of, good practice. To know the world it is 
necessary to be engaged with it, such that if “objectivity” excluded engagement it 
would have little or no epistemic value (McDowell 1998; Loughlin 1998). When 
we use “objectivity” to denote something positive, something worth having, 
we mean something like, the ability to see the world from perspectives other 
than one’s own, or the ability to weigh arguments and reach a balanced conclu-
sion. An objective person is not someone bereft of emotion, detached from and 
indifferent to the suffering of others (again, if it is a capacity we want practition-
ers of any sort to have), but rather it is someone with the mental discipline to 
find the level and manner of emotional engagement appropriate to respond 
compassionately and helpfully to the problem at hand (Marcum 2011).
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Of course, such accounts of objectivity are value-laden, but to complain that 
such an account is evaluative is still to be caught up in the dichotomous frame-
work which, we suggest, needs revising at this stage in our intellectual history, 
if debates about good practice are to move forward.
9.5 Reclassifying Psychiatry
Having retraced the intellectual steps that led to what some called the “crisis” 
in psychiatry, we have arrived at the conclusion that the discipline must aban-
don all pretentions to value-neutrality, and reject value-subjectivism in favor of 
value-realism. Psychiatry is a discipline whose essential purpose is concerned 
with promoting the human good. The fact that this project is value-laden is not 
the problem. What we need in order to explain the reality of mental health and 
illness is a less restrictive conception of reality.
The problem is philosophical: the influence of scientism and the idea that 
“objective reality” consists only of that which is detectable and measurable 
according to certain methods. Only when we make that idea explicit, identify 
it as the problem, and reject it, can we move forward and start to talk about 
the sort of value-judgments that unavoidably inform diagnosis, and discuss 
their rationale with reference to a defensible conception of the human good. 
That’s the point to which we must return, before we can recommence our 
journey to validate our notions of mental health and illness. The debate we 
need to have is within the field of ethics. Ethics is not a side issue but concep-
tually central to psychiatry.
This does not mean that we must abandon science, but instead we must move 
beyond the idea that there is an absolute dichotomy or incompatibility between 
science and morality. Scientific thinking, like all human thinking, takes place 
in the context of living a human life, and engaging with the world in ways 
that require the making of value-judgments. Psychiatry and other disciplines 
devoted to improving people’s mental health are moral disciplines, and it is the 
modern misunderstanding of that truth—the sense that it is worrying or prob-
lematic—that calls out for explanation.
We noted earlier that Fulford would not join us in defending value-realism, 
and his own thoughts on the issue nicely illustrate this modern reaction. 
Commenting on three responses to his own work on “Values-based practice” 
(Brecher 2011, Hutchinson 2011, and Thornton 2011), he asserts that:
there are clear hints of totalitarian leanings (understood as commitment to pre-set 
“good outcomes”) in all three commentators’ positions: Brecher’s apparent endorse-
ment of “moral objectivism”, .  .  . Hutchinson’s advocacy of Eudemonia as “the Good 
Life” (p. 1001, emphasis added but Hutchinson’s capitalization), and Thornton’s moral 
particularism . . . all suggest authoritarianism. (Fulford 2013: 539)
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According to Fulford, the problem with Brecher’s moral objectivism (he is a 
Kantian), Hutchinson’s commitment to Aristotelian ethics (as evidenced by his 
usage of “the Good Life”), and Thornton’s moral particularism would seem to 
be, simply, that they are all versions of what we have called realism with respect 
to value. The very fact that these authors, in their very different ways, think that 
moral judgments are truth-apt, is a sign, for Fulford, that they are “authoritar-
ians” with “totalitarian leanings.” How does this follow?
Fulford notes that “authoritarianism in the guise of totalitarian psychiatry” 
was “the basis of some of the worst abuses of medical practice in the twentieth 
century” (2013: 539). Referencing the treatment of political dissidents in the 
Soviet Union, he adds that: “Similar though less endemic forms of abuse have 
been driven in all areas of psychiatry by this or that authority imposing its own 
particular vision of what is right” (2013: 539).
To be accurate, he should also note that the views about “what is right” 
here have by no means been restricted to views about what is morally right or 
wrong. Nor have the oppressors consistently used psychiatry as their rationale 
or mechanism of imposition. People have been deprived of their autonomy 
and dignity for disagreeing with the approved viewpoint on almost any matter, 
by those wielding political power, throughout recorded history. Religion and 
genetics have similarly been abused to vindicate violence, persecution, and 
even the attempted eradication of whole castes deemed decadent or inferior.
Those of us who espouse the value-realism Fulford apparently deems symp-
tomatic of “authoritarianism” are in a position to regard these abuses as genu-
inely wrong—in contrast to the value-subjectivist, who must regard these things 
as wrong only from a given perspective, such that “the holocaust was just the 
Nazi’s way of doing things” (Clark 1988). We can only have a rational basis 
for condemning totalitarianism if value-subjectivism is false, so any argu-
ment moving from the evident wickedness of totalitarianism to a rejection 
of value-realism looks at risk of pulling the inferential rug from under itself 
(Loughlin 2002: 206–21).
So what is Fulford’s argument here? He does seem to move from the observa-
tion that these authors hold the view that moral judgments are truth-apt, to the 
implication that they are somehow (logically?) committed to approving of prac-
tices that he rightly regards as reprehensible. Because Brecher, Hutchinson, and 
Thornton think that evaluative questions can have right answers, can we infer 
that they are more likely to imprison you for disagreeing with them than some-
one who thinks that all moral questions are fundamentally arbitrary? Is some-
one heavily influenced by Nietzsche’s work on moral nihilism (for instance, a 
1930s fascist) far less likely to imprison those who oppose his political agen-
das than a Kantian moral objectivist like Brecher? We assume this is not what 
Fulford is saying, as it is clearly false.
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People have been imprisoned and tortured for believing that the Earth orbits 
the sun, rather than vice versa. Is the conclusion to be inferred from this abuse 
of power that the issue in question cannot be an objective one, that the ques-
tion of which object orbits which is just a matter of opinion? Instead of reject-
ing the idea that the question has a right answer, we should instead conclude 
that the use of violence, repression, and torture is not the correct way to settle 
controversial questions, because that way of settling such questions is rationally 
invalid and morally wrong. I do not prove that you are wrong about any matter, 
scientific or moral, by locking you up. Indeed, the desire to lock up dissidents 
may betray a lack of rational arguments on the matter at hand.
Fulford’s equation of “totalitarian leanings” with “a commitment to pre-set 
‘good outcomes’ ”5 (in psychiatry and in medical practice more generally) sug-
gests a different reading of his argument. We take it as read that he is not claim-
ing that his opponents are committed to a view about which outcomes are good, 
prior to considering the arguments and evidence relevant to any specific case. 
If so, then he would surely be knocking down a straw man, and doing a great 
disservice to his three correspondents. If he is simply saying that totalitarians 
claim, incorrectly, that by repression they will improve the lives of the peo-
ple they repress, then surely the problem is that this claim is typically false. 
Self-determination is a component of the human good. While we cannot rule 
out in principle the possibility that some psychiatric patients, given their spe-
cific problems and circumstances, will need to be restrained for their own good, 
the burden of proof should always be on those advocating such extreme meas-
ures to argue that, in this specific instance, such an extraordinary decision is 
the right one. The fact that totalitarians have claimed, falsely, to be restraining 
people for their own good when, in fact, the restraint simply served the totali-
tarian’s own political agenda, does mean we should look at all such arguments 
with a particularly skeptical eye.
Despite struggling to find a valid reading of his argument, we think that 
Fulford’s worries (about treating psychiatry as fundamentally a discipline dedi-
cated to promoting the good) will be shared by many modern readers, and not 
because either Fulford or those readers are misguided. One clear intellectual 
advance brought about by the attack on the objectivity of value-judgments was 
a greater skepticism, a greater caution regarding pronouncing on matters of 
right and wrong.
Taken to the logical extreme of value-subjectivism, such an attitude becomes 
self-defeating, as if there really is no right answer to a question, then it strictly 
doesn’t matter which answer you give, as none is better than any other. In that 
case, the caution inspired by a degree of skepticism disappears. Caution (as a mean 
between the extremes of unreflective certainty and paralyzing self-doubt) is the 
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virtue that makes us aware of our own fallibility. So the skepticism about making 
value-judgments regarding the lives and behavior of others, evident in the work 
of thinkers including both Szasz and Fulford, expresses a healthy attitude, and 
one that needs to be cultivated in the education of practitioners in many fields, 
including psychiatry. That said, contrary to the views of both of these authors, the 
correct theory explaining why this attitude is healthy is that the more practition-
ers possess the virtue of caution, the more likely we are to have genuinely good 
outcomes, and the less likely we are to have outcomes that are genuinely harmful.
The cautious attitude may be at work in Fulford’s apparent (and mistaken) 
belief that Hutchinson’s use of the definite article and capitalization in character-
izing “the Good Life” is a “clear hint” of an “authoritarian” mind-set. Fulford is 
of course well aware that this use of terminology reflects Hutchinson’s commit-
ment to Aristotelian virtue ethics, but Fulford draws attention to Hutchinson’s 
talk of “the” Good Life (as opposed, one assumes, to “a” range of possible good 
lives) because Fulford is also acutely aware that psychiatry has often helped 
repress difference, to regard diversion from the norms of belief and action in 
one’s own society as a sign of “madness” (Fulford 2013: 539).
This is an easy mistake to make if one fails to make the distinctions noted in 
the passages cited in Thornton’s article between statistical and normative con-
ceptions of “the norm.” The statistical norm—knowledge of “what people usu-
ally do around here”—is rarely a good indicator of what normative stance we 
ought to take up with regard to the behavior in question. There are notorious 
examples, such as the classification of homosexuality as a mental illness in our 
not too distant history, to demonstrate the fallacy of moving from empirical 
observations of the statistical norm to patently evaluative conclusions about 
the status of such “abnormal” behavior, in the absence of any independent 
moral argument that there is anything genuinely wrong or harmful about the 
behavior to be “corrected.” A rudimentary education in meta-ethics should 
be sufficient to expose the fallacy here—the same one that would lead us to 
attempt to “correct” those with above average intelligence to make them more 
stupid, so as to “help” them achieve the statistical norm.
The correct point to conclude from this, we think, is not that psychiatrists and 
others should be taught to think of diagnosis as value-neutral (which it never is), 
but rather that they need the sort of education, in critical moral thinking, that will 
enable them to realize why such evaluations are fallacious, and more broadly will 
enable them to practice well in a professional context that requires them to con-
front irreducibly evaluative questions. A minimal requirement for an acceptable 
education of this sort would be that it should make them powerfully aware that 
the conventions in one’s own society are not immune from criticism. Ryan (2011) 
has argued that the education of social workers should emphasize the critical skill 
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of knowing when they must challenge, rather than enforce, social norms. As there 
is no point denying that their behavior will have some value-base, it is worth ena-
bling them to think rationally about that value-base, to become the autonomous 
and virtuous professionals that we need them to be. Similar arguments seem to us 
to apply to the education of psychiatrists.
To evoke Aristotelian virtue ethics in defense of the repression of diversity 
in society would, of course, be to employ a “bastardized” version of virtue eth-
ics, and not one to which Hutchinson has ever subscribed. People have a wide 
range of different skills, interests, qualities, and preferences, and allowing a 
diversity of lifestyles is the best way to facilitate human flourishing—just as 
allowing diverse opinions to be openly debated facilitates social progress. Such 
diversity benefits, rather than harms, the community, allowing new ideas to 
be considered so that intellectual and social progress remain real possibilities, 
allowing diverse skills and insights to contribute to the meeting of the com-
munity’s needs, and generally making life for its members a good deal more 
interesting. Thinking that talk of “the Good Life” implies believing in one, 
homogenous vision of how to live well, so ruling out diversity, is like thinking 
that because someone refers to “the Ocean” he can only see a flat surface, and 
is unaware of all of the different eddies, currents, and waves that the mass of 
water necessarily embodies. Virtue ethics as a commitment to promoting the 
human good (and the value-realism it presupposes) no more requires calling 
in the “totalitarian psychiatrist” to stamp out diversity of thought and action 
within society, than calling a mass of water “the Ocean” implies calling in King 
Canute to command it to be still. Similarly, the versions of value-realism pre-
supposed by Brecher and Thornton provide no valid defense of the totalitarian 
psychiatry Fulford rightly abhors. Properly understood, they provide ways of 
validating Fulford’s underlying intuition that this is the wrong way to practice 
psychiatry. 6
9.6 Conclusion
The debate about the values that should inform psychiatric practice has always 
been a moral one, and if freed from the shackles of scientism it could be debated 
unapologetically in these terms. All judgments—in science, in morality, in any 
aspect of human life—are “subjective” in the trivial sense that they require a 
subject, but not in the sense that they are “merely” subjective reactions to the 
world, such that they cannot be truth-apt.
To fully validate our claims in psychiatric and indeed in general medical 
diagnosis, we need to discuss and defend our value-judgments about health 
and illness. We must reject scientism for an openly value-laden account of 
human functioning. Medical epistemology (including the epistemology 
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of mental illness) requires value-realism. The contentious nature of the 
value-judgments in the case of mental illness should not mislead us into con-
cluding they are “subjective” or “relative.”
Are some value-judgments better than others? We contend that this is mani-
festly the case, and that it is the modern skepticism of that assertion that rep-
resents the real intellectual puzzle. Such skepticism can be vindicated not as a 
thesis but (at least partially) as an attitude that informs the mind-set of a vir-
tuous practitioner. We need an approach to the education of practitioners, in 
psychiatry and in other areas of medicine, that cultivates the crucial virtue of 
caution with respect to judgments that can have a profound effect on people’s 
lives. This involves recognizing the diversity of lifestyles that can represent 
human flourishing, while being open to the possibility that some lifestyles are 
genuinely harmful.
Ethics is not a subsidiary component of psychiatry but is conceptually central 
to the subject. It is not as though one can study the epistemology of psychiatry 
and then, as a separate task, discuss its ethics, as the latter forms an inseparable 
part of the former: taking up an evaluative stance toward the nature of psychiat-
ric disorders is an essential component of understanding what a psychiatric dis-
order is. Education in the mental health professions should encourage cautious, 
critical reflection on the value-judgments about health and illness that inform 
diagnosis, and discussion of their rationale with reference to their underlying 
conception of the human good. As we have by no means arrived at the end of 
intellectual history or moral evolution, discussion of the correct way to char-
acterize the human good is ongoing. But any defensible conceptions of mental 
health, any efforts to categorize mental illness and to diagnose it in practice, 
must be framed with reference to a conception of the human good, so the more 
serious thought we put into this fundamental ethical project, the better for all of 
us—those who practice and those they treat.
Notes
1. Some authors may feel there is an important distinction between “moral” and “ethical,” but 
we have never been able to work out what precisely it is (cf. Loughlin 2002: 27–31).
2. Given a sufficiently broad conception of “experience”—for instance that embraced by 
Husserl (1970)—we could arguably include the normative within the “empirical,” treating 
evaluative perception as part of our experience. But we are using the term here in a sense 
more akin to that of the British empiricists: normative claims do not count as “empirical” 
in the sense intended by Ayer (1987).
3. Anyone who believes there to be a systematic, necessary link between high intelligence and 
having many children is invited to watch the American comedy Idiocracy.
4. Arguably, Aristotelian attacks on pre-Socratic atomism represented progress in their time, 
but they rightly did not preclude the reintroduction of atomistic thinking at a later stage in 
human history (Loughlin et al. 2013a: 142).
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5. The insistence on putting terms like “good outcomes” in inverted commas, even when not 
directly quoting, may suggest the background belief that no outcomes are really good or 
bad—it’s just that some people say/think of things as good and bad, as part of their subjec-
tive reaction to the world.
6. In fairness to Fulford, we should point out that we have only focused on his specific claims 
about the belief in “good outcomes” and “authoritarianism,” and his use of the examples he 
cites from psychiatry. He makes these claims in the context of a discussion of Values-based 
Practice (VBP). While we do not think this invalidates anything we have said, he would 
no doubt want us to say a lot about his distinction between “good outcome” and “right 
process” to do justice to that broader debate. For a discussion of VBP’s relationship to 
value-subjectivism, see Cassidy (2013).
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